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. Comme11litlg ou why it has taken lhe United States sq long to apply "the
privilege against se/f-iucrimiualion and tire right lo counsel to the proceedings fo
the stalionho11se as well as lo those ifi the courlroom"-as the Supreme Court
did iii Miranda v. Arizona- t/iis author notes that, "To a large exte11t this is so
because here, as elsewhere, there has been a wide gap between the prhici/J/cs lo
which.we aspire a11d the practices we actually employ."

The Citizen on Trial:
The New Confession Rules
BY YALE KAMISAR

l'ro/cssor of Law, U11ivcrsity of Micliiga11
Tm~ professional and amateur students !'f criminal justice in the
United States June 13, 1966, was
D-Day. On that occasion, the Supreme
Court handed down its Jong-awaited decision
in the landmark confession case of Mira11da
v. Arizona,1 finally applying the privilege
against selr-incriminalion and the right to
counsel to the proceedings in the stationhouse
as well as to those in the courtroom. " The
traditional and often elusive "voluntariness"
test for the admissibility of confessions was
displaced by a set of relatively specific,
"automatic" guidelines. Thereaftor, for any
resulting confession to be used in a criminal
prosecution, police interrogators were required to issue four-fold waming to persons
in custody, advising them that: 1) they had
a right to remain silent, 2) anything they
did say could be used against them, 3) they
had a right to have an attorney present during
the questioning, and 4) if they could not
afford a lawyer one would be provided free.

F

In what may prove lo be an extremely
important part of the opinion, the High Com·t
warned Jaw enforcement officials that if they
continue to question a person without the
p1·esence of an attorney and a statement is
taken, a "heavy burden" resls on them to
demonst..ale that the defendant knowingly
nnd intelligently waived his rights; regardless
of the police version of how they elicited the
incriminating statement, "lengthy interrogation" or "incommunicado incarceration" before a statement is obtained is "strong evidence" that the defendant did not waive his
rights.
Mira11da soon became one 0£ the most publicized and debated cases of our time.
Handed down when we were experiencing a
"crime crisis" 2-a crisis to which, many sust>cctcd, the Supreme Court had contributed
heavily-the new confession ruling evoked
much angu and spread much sorrow among
bench and bat· and the general public, to say
nothing of the already harassed and embittered police, a goodly number of whom once
again announced they "might as well close
up shop."
One week later, and almost unnoticed in
the·hue and cry, the Supreme Court decided
another case, one which has not received

OR

a

1384 U.S. 436 ( 1966). For excerpts from this
decision, see Current Hi1lory, June, 1967, p. 359.
t Sec this author's "On the Tactics or Police·
Prosecution Oriented Critics or the Courts," Cor·
nell Law Quarterly, Vol. 49 ~1964), p. 436; and
"When the Cops Were Not Handcuffed,' " The
New York Times Mllgazine, November 7, 1965, p.
34.
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anything like the attention it deserves: Davis
v. North Garoli11a. 8 Since Davis was attacking a 1959 murder conviction by seeking a
writ of habeas corpus and since the new confession standards were not to be given "retroactive" effect (the Supreme Court had made
it clear that the new test would not be applied to cases whose trials had commenced
before the new rules had been promulgated),
the admissibility of Davis' confessions was
governed by the traditional "voluntariness"
test. Thus, the appropriate inquiry was
not whether Davis had been adequately advised of his rights before confession but
rather whether (taking into account the
"totality of the circumstances") his confessions had been made "freely" and "voluntarily" or had been the product of an "overborne will."
DAVIS V. NORTH CAROLINA

That the Davis case has been largely overlooked is regrettable, for the history of the
case dramatically shows the ineffectiveness
and unworkability of the traditional "voluntariness" test-whose passing from the scene
four members of the High Court and many
lawyers and laymen continue to lament.
As to the particulars of the case, Davis had
a third or fourth grade education and a level
of intelligence so low that it prompted one of
the lower courts, even while affirming his conviction, to raise the moral question whether
a person of his mentality should ever be executed, His first contact with the police occurred as a small child when his mother murdered his father and his long cl'iminal record
began with a prison sentence at the age of
15. A used-up, impoverished Negro, charged
with the rape-murder of a white woman while
a fugitive from a state prison camp, Davis'
predicament was as unenviable as his sorry
background. Having lost most of life's
battles, he figured to lose life itself.
Nevertheless, Davis was more fortunate
than most alleged victims of impermissible
police interrogation tactics. At least he
could point to a specific notation on the arrest
sheet which read : "Do not allow anyone to
a 384 U.S. 505 (1966),

see Davis. Or allow him to use the telephone." Rarely, if ever, do police officials
make a written declaration, as they did in
this case, of a design to hold a suspect incommunicado. Moreover, Davis could also
point to the uncontested fact that no one
other than the police had seen or spoken to
him during the sixteen days of detention
and interrogation in an "overnight jail" which
preceded his confessions.
Helpful though these "objective facts"
were, however, they did not suffice to invalidate the confessions in the trial and
appellate courts of North Carolina in the
years 1959 and 1960. Nor did these facts,
a year later, impress the federal district
judge, who first denied Davis a hearing on
his "coerced confession" claim, and then,
when reversed on this point and forced to
conduct a hearing on the issue, found Davis'
confessions to have been "voluntary." Nor,
in the year 1964, were these facts quite
.. enough for the United States Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which upheld denial of
habeas corpus, albeit by a 3-2 vote.
·
The readiness with which the state and
lower federal courts accepted dubious police
claims, and the looseness with which they
stated (or, more accurately, failed to state)
"the facts," is hardly calculated to inspire
confidence in the workability and cffeetiveness of the test-at least from the defendant's
point of view. In affi1ming Davis' conviction, a unanimous Supreme Court of North
Carolina observed:
[T]he prisoner was advised he need not make a
statement; that if he did it might be used against
him. , . , The prisoner asked to .see his sister,
whom the officers searched for, after· some ·difficulty found, and delivered the prisoner's mes-.
sage. She appeared at the jail and Captain
McCall admitted her· to a private conference
with the prisoner.

·As it happened, the prisoner's sister ·was
admitted to a private conference with him,
but not, the state court neglected to point out,
until he had already confessed, after having
been interrogated "forty-five minutes or an
hour 01· maybe a little more" (according. to
one of the officers) . each day for 1( dayii.
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Similarly, the state court failed to note that
there was no indication in thu record that
the prisoner was advised of his rights until
the sixteenth day-a/ter he had confessed
orally but just before he had signed the written confession.
After holding its 1963 habeas corpus hearing, the federal district court had little dif•
ficulty concluding "from the totality of circumstances in this case that the confession
was the product of a rational intellect and
a free will." How did it deal with the telltale notation on the police blotter directing
that Davis be held i11com1111micado? It made
no re/ere11ce whatever lo this incongruous
item in its five-page opinion, four of which
were devoted to the "historical facts."
"The notation on the arrest record creates
suspicions," conceded the 3-2 majority of
th.e Fourth Circuit in its 1964· opinion:
but such suspicions cannot overcome the positive
evidence that the notation had no practical effect
or influence upon what was done and that help
rather than hindrance was offered to [Davis] in
his one effort to contact someone outside the
prison walls.

This, of course, was the police version. The
Fourth Circuit opinion pointed out elsewhere that Davis' sister had testified at the
habeas corpus hearing that "she twice went
to see her brother in the Charlotte City Jail,
but each time was turned away." The district court, however, "did not believe her,
finding, as the officers testified, that neither
she nor anyone else was turned away."
What, if anything, does the foregoing discussion prove? True, seven years after his
conviction, the United States Supreme Court
did finally invalidate the confcssions by a
7-2 vote (Justices Tom C. Clark and John
Marshall Harlan dissenting), But it should
not be forgotten that in the 30 years since
Brown v. Mississippi,4 the first fourteenth
amendment due-process confession case decided by the highest court of the land, the
4 297
11 See

U.S. 278 (1936).
E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Dealh and 1he
Supreme Court (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1961), pp. 297-98•.
e From an unoffiflial transcript or oral argument
in Miranda and companion case!/ p. 91 1 on file in
the Uriivenity of Michigan Law Library.
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Supreme Court has taken an average of
only one state confession case every year.
How fared the many defendants over these
years who did not have the benefit of a powerful and coherent dissenting opinion? How
fared the many defendants whose cases did
not receive the meticulous attention each
Supreme Court justice gives "death penalty"
cases ma1·ked in red, as was Davis' case and
two-thirds of the confcssion cases the Com·t
has chosen to review these past 30 years?
RIGHTS AND THE COURTS

Analyzing a recent Supreme Court term,

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., a Washington,
D.C., attorney who is a careful student of the
High Court's work, reported that the Court
was asked to review over 2,000 cases, of
which 42 involved the death penalty.
Although "all of the allegations in these capital cases were so serious that the Supreme
Court might have felt compelled to decide
each and every one of them" only one con·
dcmned man out of four received a hearing,
and only one out of eight obtained a rcvcrsal.0 How many garden-variety criminal
defendants who cried "coerced confession"
but lost the "swearing contest" below could
survive the difficult winnowing process above?
As Justice Hugo Black put it in the Mira11da
oral arguments, "if you arc going to determine
it. [the admissibility of the confession] each
time on the circumstances ... [i~ this Court
will take them one by one , .. it is more than
we arc capable of doing." 0
Whether or not it is more than the judges
in the "front lines" are capable of doing, it
seems to be more than very many of them
were ready and willing to do. The defendant
who was in fact beaten, threatened, tricked
or cajoled into confessing faced such enor·
mous, almost insurmountable, problems of
proof that the safeguards provided by the old
"totality of circumstances-voluntariness" test
were largely illusory. When, as was almost
invariably the case, the police and the defendant presented sharply conflicting versions
of what happened behind the closed doors
and when there were no means of independently verifying either version, trial
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judges were under heavy pressure to accept
the police account.
As police interrogators abandoned physical
violence and made greater use of "psycho·
logical" techniques over the years, the problems of proof became increasingly arduous.
Disputes over whether physical violence occurred are not always easy to resolve, but
evidence of "mental" or "psychological" coercion is especially elusive. Not infrequently,
the defendant is quite inarticulate, which
aggravates the difficulties of recreating the
tenor and atmosphere of the police questioning,
A short week after Justice Harlan manifested a sanguine attitude about the "workability" apd "effectivencss" of the traditional
"voluntariness" test (in his dissenting opinion
in Miranda) he and Justice Clark would have
applied the old test to sustain Davis' confessions. "The sporadic interrogation of Davis,"
as they saw it,
can hardly be denominated as sustained or overbearing pressure. From the record it appears
that he was simply questioned for about an hour
each day [for sixteen days] by a couple or de·
tectives.

do, why did they mean so little all these years?
For many decades, the "legal mind"-unhappily displaying a "trained incapacity" (to
use Thorstein Veblen's phrase} to see the
problem in the round-was equal to the task
of seeming to reconcile the grim proceedings
in the stationhouse with the lofty principles
in the Constitution: police interrogrationindeed, the "third degree"-did not violate
the Constitution because the questioning did
not involve any kind of judicial process for
the taking of testimony. The argument ran
tliat, because police officers have no legal
authority to compel statements of any kind,
there is no legal obligation to answer to which
the privilege against self-incl'imination can
apply; hence, the police can elicit statements
from suspects who are likely to assume or be
led to believe that there are legal (or extralegal} sanctions for stubbornness.'
Of course the view that police interrogation
was neither limited nor affected by the privilege ?gainst self-incrimination 01· the right to
counsel had a great deal more to commend it
than merely the inherent force of its 11J0gic"
or the self-restraint and tenderness of the
exempted class of intenogators. It must
have had, in order for it to have been taken
seriously for so long.

"Disagreement," said Justice Harlan of the
"voluntariness" test in his Miranda dissent,
"is usually confined to that borderland of
close cases where it matters least." After
three decades and 30-odd "coerced" confes.
sion cases which saw the overall gauge steadily
changing, usually in the direction of restricting police interrogation methods, was Davis
still a "close case?" If so, was the need to
scrap the "voluntariness" test still a close
question?
The question has been a~ked in many quarters: If the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel really mean as
much as the Supreme Court now says they

Among the forces at work was one of society's most effective analgcsics-"necessity,11
real or apparent. Its influence may be seen
in numerous opinions. Although Justice
Robert H. Jackson recognized, in his much·
quoted concurring opinion in the 1949 Watts
case,8 that "if the State may ••• interrogate
without counsel, there is no denying the fact
that it largely negates the benefits of the constitutional guaranty," he was willing to let
this "negation" occur, for othenvise

' See the discussion and authorities collected in
Yale Kamlsar, Fred E. Inbau and Thurman Arnold,
Criminal Justice in Our Timi (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1965), pp. 21-25,
31-33.
a Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), at 5962.
.
e Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) 1
at 578.

Again, the first axiom of Justice Felix Frank·
furter's dissertation on police interrogation
and confessions in the 1961 Culombe case9 is:
"Questioning suspects is indispensable in law

SOCIETY'S ROLE

the people of this country must discipline them·
selves to seeing their police stand by helpleisly
while those susp~cted of murder prowl about unmolested,
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enforcement." "Questioning," as Justice
Frankfurther and many others used the
tenn, is a euphemistic "shorthand" for questioning without advising the suspect of his
rights or pennitting defense counsel, friends
or relatives to be present.
As Justice Arthur J. Goldberg observed in
the Escobedo case,10 the police interrogation
practices which have prevailed in this country until very recently were based in large
measure on
the /ear that if an accused is permitted to consult
with a lawyer, he will become aware of and exercise, these rights.

* * *

If the exercise of constitutional rights will
thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement [Justice Goldberg commented further),
then there is something very wrong with that
system.

The lack of confidence in and impatience
with the principles we profess-when the
chips arc really down-was noted by Justice
Frankfurter in another context, that of "trial
by newspaper-and TV." Dissenting from
the Court's opinion sustaining a conviction
for the sexual molestation-murder of a little
girl, despite sensational pretrial press coverage of the event, Justice Frankfurter protested:
Such passion as the newspapers stirred in this
case can be explained (apart from mere commercial exploitation of revolting crime) only as
want of confidence in the orderly course of justice. To allow such use of the press by the prosecution as the California court [and the United
States Supreme Court] here left undisciplined,
implies either that the ascertainment of guilt can10
11

378 U.S. 478 {1964), at 490.
Stroble v. Cahfornia, 343 U.S. 181 (1952),

at 201-02.
12 Office of the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, Results of Survey Regarding the Ef•
fects of the Dorado and Miranda Dtcisions Upon
the Prostcution of Felony Cases (August 4, 1966),
p. 4, copy on file in the University of Michigan
Law Library.
13 Thurman Arnold, The Symbols of Government (Harbinger ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace
& World, 1962), p. 142.
14 Herbert Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal
Process," Uniu1mity of Pennsylvania Law Review,
Vol.113 (1964),p.64.
1n Colin Macinnes, "The Criminal Society," in
The Police and the Public (London: William
Heinemann Ltd., 1962), p. IOI.
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not be left to the established processes of law or
impatience with those calmer aspects of the judicial process which may not satisfy the natural,
primitive, popular revulsion against horrible
crime but do vindicate the sober second thoughts
of a community.a

It now appears that the "necessity" for in·
terrogating suspects without advising them of
theh· rights was considerably exaggerated.
For example, after surveying more than 1,000
post-Miranda cases, in fully half of which the
defendant had made an incriminating statement, Evelle Younger, Los Angeles district
attorney, concluded:
Large or small, ••• conscience usually or at least
often, drives a guilty person to confess. If nn
individual wants to confess, a warning from a
police officer, acting as required by recent decisions, is not likely to discourage him.12

Other significant factors operating over
many decades to freeze the status quo were
the invisibility of the stationhouse proceedings
-no other case comes to mind in which an
administrative official is pennitted the same
broad discretionary power assumed by the
police interrogators, together with the power
to prevent objective recorclation of the factsancl the failure of influential groups to iclentify with those segments of our society which
furnish most of the raw material for the
criminal process. As Thmman Amold, a
former federal judge and a former United
States assistant attorney general, once pointed
out, too many people are roused by any "violation of the symbol of a ceremonial trial,"
but "left unmoved by an ordinary nonceremonial injustice." 13 And as Professor Herbert Packer of the Stanford Law School recently observed:
One of the most powerful features of the Due
Process Model is that it thrives on visibility.
People are willing to be complacent about what
goes on In the criminal process as long as they nre
not too often or too explicitly reminded of the
gory details.14

Society, one might add, does not want to be
reminded, docs not "want to know about
criminals, but it docs want them put away,
and it is incurious how this can be clone provided it is clone." 15 It stings now to say it,
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for we al"e too close to it; but in the first two·
thirds of the twentieth century too many
people, good people, viewed the typical police
auspcct and his interrogator as garbage and
garbage collector, respectively. (Thia is every
bit as unfortunate for the officer as it is for
tho suspect.)
Moreover, with the inadvertent exception
of those who wrote the interrogation manu·
ab-each manual very likely equal to a dozen
law review articles in ita Impact on the Court
(tho majority opinion in Mira11da devotes six
Cull pages to extracts from various police
manuals and texts spelling out techniques for
depriving the suspect of every psychological
advantage, keeping him "off balance," exploiting his fear and insecurity, and tricking
or cajoling him out of exercising his rights)most law enforcement agency members and
their spokesmen did their best to keep society
comfortable and blissfully ignorant. Not too
aurprisingly, they were much more interested
In "sanitizing" the proceedings in the interrogation room than in diMeminating the liiesi1.0 details. As long ago as 1910 (when,
everybody now agrees, things were in a terrible atatc), the president of the ~ntemational
Association of Chiefs of Police aMured us: 11
Volunteer confessions and adm!Nlons made after
a prisoner luu been cautioned that what he
1tate1 may be used agalnat hlm, are all there la
to the 10-called "Third Degree."

/u recently as July, 1966, tlte veteran special agent of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, Alvin A. Dewey, of Jn Cold Bloot11'
fame, testified before the Senate subcommittee on constitutional amendments: 19
u Major Richard Sylveater'1 commenta are reported In John Lnnon, "Preient Police and Legal
Method• for tho Deterrillnatlon o( the Innocence or
Guilt o( the Suspect!' Jo urnal of Criminal Law and
Crimlnolon, Vol. lb (1925)1 pp. 222-25.
n See Truman Capote, In Cold Blood (New
York: Random House, 1966).
1' Statement ot Alvin A. Dewey before the aubcommlttee on conatltutlonal amendments of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 21, 1966{
p. 2 (mimeographed), on file In the University o
Mlchfian Law Library.
1t National Commluion on Law Observance and
Enforcement R1~ort on Lawlmnus in Law En·
fore1m1nt (Wuhlngton1 U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1931), generally referred to 11 the Wicklr·
Jhom R1Jorl.

What la wrong with an officer exercising per1i1tence or ah owing confidence? hn't that what
any good 1aleaman demonstrates In 1e1Ung IDJurance or a car? And a law enforcement omcer
ahould be a good aatcsman in 1clllng a auapect on
telling the truth, proving his Innocence or guilt.
But a snlcsman cannot do hi1 Job if a competitor
is standing by, and that b the 1ituatlon for the
law enforcement officer with tho pre.cnco of an
attorney whllc Interrogating a 1u1pect.

• • •

As to the dcmlptlon of an Interrogation room,
I wl1h to define It as a room where people can
talk In privacy which la nothing more than an
attorney dc1lre1 In talking to his client or a doctor In talking to hia patient. , , , (These rooms)
bear no reaomblnnce to torture chambcn as some
may wish to thlnlt, and In fnct 1omc are equipped
with air conditioning, carpeting, and upholatered
furniture,

PERSISTENT ROOTS

What I have suggested so far does not fully
account for the persistence of the de facto inquisitorial system. In the late 1920'1 and
early 1930111 complacency about the system
Wa.1 shaken-at least for a while-by several
notorious cases, and by the shocking disclosures of the Wickersham Commission's report
on "lawlwness 1n law enforcement."11 Still
the system survived. Why? Probably because, in addition to tho facto11 already mentioned, the practice had become so widespread
and entrenched that even most of its critics
despaired of completely uprooting it in the
foreseeable future. A broad, fundamental
attack on the system might well have failed
completely; elimination of the more aggra(Conlinutd on fH!.gt 114) ·
Yale Kamisar is the author of numerous law
journal articles on .the con1litutional dimensions of criminal procedure and is coauthor
of Criminal /uslic1 in Our Timo (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1965)
(with Fred E. Inbau and Thurman Am~ld);
Modern Criminal Proeedum Cam, .Comments and Questions (2d ed.; St. Paul: West
Publishing Co., 1966) (with Livingston
Hall) ; and Constitutional !Aw: Oases,
Comments and Quesl{ons (2d ed.; St. Paul:
West Publishing Co., 1961) (with William
B. Lockhart and Jesse H; Cho~~).
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CITIZEN ON TRIAL
( Conlinfled from page 81)
vated lonns of coercion commanded a high
priority and alone appeared feasible. In
this regard, the pessimistic views, some 36
years ago, of Harvard Law School's Zechal'iah
Cha(ee, coauthor of the famous report to the
Wickersham Commission on "the third de·
gree," 20 arc instructive:
It 11 hard enough to prevent policemen Crom

using physical violence on suspects; it would be
(or harder to prevent them from asking a few
questions. We had better get rid of the rubber
hose and twenty.four hour grillings before we
undertake to compel or penuade the police to
give up questioning altogether.tt

New advances in constitutional-criminal
procedure have rarely suffered from a short20 Ibid., p. 26.

Zechariah Chafce, "Remedies (or the Third
Thi Atlantic Monthly, November, 1931.
pp. 621, 630.
21

Deg~e,"
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age of absolutely thunderstruck commenta·
to11. Miranda is no exception. To a large
extent this is so because here, as elsewhere,
there has been a wide gap between the principles to which we aspire and the practicr.s we
actually employ. The offidally prescribed
norms-what Professor Packer calls the Due
Process Model-view the criminal process as
limited by and subordinate to the maintenance
of the dignity and autonomy of the individual.
But the real-world criminal process, what
Packer calls the "assembly line" Crime Con·
trot model, sees the "efficient" disposition of
criminal suspects as the central value to be
served and tends to be far more administrative
and managerial than it docs adversary and
judicial.11

PRIZE FOR INGENUITY
In theory or principle, there is nothing
really startling or inventive about the new
confession ntllng. The prize for ingenuity,
I think it may foirly be said, goes not to the
Supreme Court for finally applying the privilege against self-incrimination and the right
to counsel to the police station but rather to
those who managed to devise rationales for
excluding these rights from the stationhouse
all these many years."
It may be that we cannot really do in this
area of the Jaw what we have done with
respect to school segregation and legislative
malapportionment, namely take our ideals
down from the walls where we have kept them
framed "to be pointed at with pride on cere·
monial occasions," and Instead "put flesh
and blood" on them."u But this task must
be left to Miranda's hope for a more enlightened posterity.
u Sec Packer, op. cil., pp. 1-68, and the same
and the Red of
U1," Journal o/ Criminal Law, Criminology and
Po1ic1 Sei1nt1, Vol. !17 (1966), p. 239.
ta The point ii elabOrated In thla author'• "A
Dissent from the Miranda Dissentsi Somo Comments on the 'New' Fifth Amendment and the Old
'Voluntariness' Testt' Michigan Law Review, Vol.
65, (1966), pp. 64-76.
tt The quoted la_nguage ls taken from the re·
marks of Justice Walter Schaefer of the 1111·
nol1 Supreme Court In "Symposium on Poverty,
Equality and the Administration of Criminal JII!•
tlce," K111luel;~ Law Journal, Vol. !14 ( 1966), pp.
!121, !12+.
writer'• "The Courts, the Police

